From 69dfabca3ae2ed857e654d677076a72ea4d5e76c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Insogna Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 16:21:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] doc: trust FFI in the threat model Signed-off-by: Paolo Insogna --- SECURITY.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 540ab0f9dee80d..0e88d7b50702fa 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ then untrusted input must not lead to arbitrary JavaScript code execution. along with anything under the control of the operating system. * The code it is asked to run, including JavaScript, WASM and native code, even if said code is dynamically loaded, e.g., all dependencies installed from the - npm registry. + npm registry or libraries loaded via `node:ffi`. The code run inherits all the privileges of the execution user. * Inputs provided to it by the code it is asked to run, as it is the responsibility of the application to perform the required input validations,