fix(audit): H-02 BLS replay, H-01 CEI order, L-04 zero-addr + V5.3 tests & docs#71
fix(audit): H-02 BLS replay, H-01 CEI order, L-04 zero-addr + V5.3 tests & docs#71
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- GTokenStaking: add MAX_TOTAL_STAKE = 21M ether constant, enforce in lockStake() and topUpStake() to prevent totalStaked exceeding GToken supply; bump version to Staking-3.2.1 - PaymasterBase: remove this.updatePrice() external self-call in postOp (redundant — useRealtime=true already reads oracle directly); keep this.calculateCost() try/catch for safety; bump version to PaymasterV4-4.3.2 - Tests: update version assertions and adapt stale-price test to new behavior Audit source: Kimi + Challenger reviews (2026-03-26)
…sion to 4.3.1 The previous commit incorrectly removed this.updatePrice() as a "gas optimization". Analysis shows it serves as a self-healing mechanism: when the Keeper is delayed and the cache goes stale between validatePaymasterUserOp and postOp, the call opportunistically refreshes cachedPrice so subsequent validations can set validUntil to a future time. Without it, the system freezes until the Keeper manually refreshes — removing it would change observable behavior beyond pure gas savings. PaymasterBase has no net behavioral change vs feature/micropayment. Version reverted: PaymasterV4-4.3.2 → PaymasterV4-4.3.1
…r, P-04 decode H-02 (HIGH): Registry.batchUpdateGlobalReputation allowed proposalId=0 which silently skipped replay protection. Now requires proposalId != 0 (InvalidProposalId error). ReputationSystem.syncToRegistry derives proposalId = keccak256(user, epoch) — unique per call since epoch is monotonically increasing per user. H-01 (reordered): SuperPaymaster postOp now records user xPNTs debt (or saves to pendingDebts) BEFORE crediting refund to operator. Prevents operator receiving excess aPNTs while user escapes xPNTs debt if recordDebt fails at MAX_SINGLE_TX_LIMIT. L-04: Add address(0) guards to setBLSAggregator (SuperPaymaster + Registry) and Registry.setSuperPaymaster. These are onlyOwner functions but defensive invariants prevent accidentally disabling critical integrations. P-04: MySBT.mintForRole decoded roleData twice (address, then address+string). Now decoded once: if len>32 decode both together, else decode address only. 414/414 forge tests pass.
Comment incorrectly said "PostOp no longer calls this.updatePrice()". In fact updatePrice() IS still called (via try/catch) but the oracle's own staleness guard rejects the stale price and reverts inside catch, so no PriceUpdated event is emitted. Clarify the actual mechanism.
…ata helper GTokenStaking: pre-check totalStaked+stakeAmount before write (avoids redundant SLOAD on hot staking path; also fixes CEI — validate before mutate) SuperPaymaster: trim 5-line H-01 audit narration to 1-line invariant comment (prose belongs in commit/audit doc, not bytecode-adjacent source) MySBT: extract _decodeRoleData() internal pure helper — was decoded once-per-branch in both mintForRole and airdropMint (4 identical blocks); now decoded once above each branch split using shared helper (eliminates copy-paste, saves ~50 gas on >32-byte path)
…o Guide API_SUPERPAYMASTER.md: bump to SuperPaymaster-5.3.0, add V5.x functions (settleX402Payment, settleX402PaymentDirect, chargeMicroPayment, isEligibleForSponsorship, setAgentPolicies), update Sepolia addresses, add storage layout section API_REGISTRY.md: bump to Registry-4.1.0, document immutable REGISTRY pattern, InvalidProposalId error (H-02 fix), setStaking auto-sync, zero-addr guards DEVELOPER_INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md: add V5.3 scenarios (x402 payment, agent sponsorship, micropayment channel) to existing V3/V4 integration guide docs/SDK-E2E-Scenario-Guide.md (NEW): 7 business scenarios mapped to contract calls, events, and viem SDK pseudo-code — authoritative reference for SDK integration
W2c — ECOSYSTEM-SERVICES-SETUP-GUIDE.md:
- x402-facilitator-node: env config, Docker deployment, HMAC setup
- Price Keeper: daemon config, systemd service, staleness check
- MCP Server: Claude Desktop registration, available tools table
- Full stack startup checklist + ecosystem health check script
- Troubleshooting section for common operator issues
W3a — 3 new E2E scenario test scripts:
- G1: Reputation-gated sponsorship (isEligibleForSponsorship,
globalReputation, getCreditLimit, tier simulation)
- G2: Agent identity sponsorship — ERC-8004 dual-channel
(isRegisteredAgent, setAgentPolicies, getAgentSponsorshipRate,
facilitatorFeeBPS)
- G3: Credit tier escalation (levelThresholds, creditTierConfig,
getCreditLimit, setCreditTier admin, getAvailableCredit)
Supporting changes:
- test-helpers.js: +V5.3 SuperPaymaster ABI entries (agent, x402,
credit functions) + MicroPaymentChannel ABI + getContracts V5.3
- run-all-e2e-tests.sh: Phase 7 G1/G2/G3, old Phase 7 → Phase 8
- reputationSystem: 0xB54F98b5... → 0x3384317Da5312077218C990CeB1010CCb5dc5897 - updateTime: 2026-03-24 → 2026-03-29 Deployed in fix/audit-remediation: Registry impl: 0x84bB9e3CAfb90C5938731A6dA1ADdee301F0B2D0 SuperPaymaster impl: 0xf4d022Ea721Aaa1Dec8CC8f3B630547D34C6c972 Proxy addresses unchanged (UUPS).
AAStar: "Empower Community, Unleash Humanity🍄", ENS: aastar.eth - Also fixed InitializeTestCommunities logoURI from placeholder to real IPFS CID Mycelium: "Protocols and Networks", ENS: mushroom.box - Updated in DeployLive.s.sol and TestAccountPrepare.s.sol
…false positive RegistryV2Reinit (test contract inheriting Registry) is 12 bytes over the 24,576 limit after the H-02 audit fix added ~12 bytes to Registry bytecode. Production Registry itself is 24,430 bytes (146 bytes margin) — within limit. The explicit "Check EIP-170 Contract Sizes" step already enforces the production limit on Registry specifically; the --sizes flag on the build step is redundant.
RegistryV2Reinit inherits Registry (+3 small functions). The H-02 audit fix added ~12 bytes to Registry bytecode, pushing RegistryV2Reinit 12 bytes over the 24,576 EIP-170 limit. Shortening the version() return from "Registry-5.0.0-test" (20 chars) to "R2" (2 chars) saves ~18 bytes in bytecode. New size: 24,561 bytes (15 bytes margin). Also restores forge build --sizes in CI (was temporarily removed as workaround). All 22 SupplementaryLifecycle tests pass.
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Codex usage limits have been reached for code reviews. Please check with the admins of this repo to increase the limits by adding credits. |
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处理过程：
当前状态：
已记住：禁止执行 merge，review/comment/ready 才是我的职责范围。 |
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PR #63 现在包含完整的 code review，说明了所有 17 个文件的变更： 合约层（6 文件，最小侵入）：
文档层（5 文件）：
测试层（4 文件）：
414/414 forge tests pass，可以合并。 |
🚀 Sepolia Audit-Fix Deployment CompleteDate: 2026-03-29 Deployed / Upgraded Contracts
Skipped (low priority / high migration cost):
On-Chain VerificationTransaction receipts (Sepolia):
Full E2E Test Results (Sepolia)Total: 20 groups | ✅ Passed: 14 | ❌ Failed: 6
All 6 failures are infrastructure / transient — NOT contract bugs:
Core gasless end-to-end flows (Phase 8) all pass ✅ — confirms audit fixes are live and working. Config Updated
- "reputationSystem": "0xB54F98b5133e8960ad92F03F98fc5868dd57deA2"
+ "reputationSystem": "0x3384317Da5312077218C990CeB1010CCb5dc5897"
- "updateTime": "2026-03-24 14:30:00"
+ "updateTime": "2026-03-29 00:00:00"Ready to merge. All audit fixes (H-01, H-02, L-04) are live on Sepolia. Proxy addresses unchanged — no client-side changes required. |
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最终 E2E 重跑汇总 ┌──────────────────────────────────┬────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┐ 所有原始失败均已确认为非合约问题，部署验证完成。PR #63 可以合并。 |
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✅ 已完成 ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┐ |
1 participant
Summary
Audit remediation for SuperPaymaster V5.3.0.
Contract Fixes
proposalId=0BLS replay —if (proposalId == 0) revert InvalidProposalId()in RegistryrecordDebt()called BEFORE aPNTs refund in SuperPaymaster postOpsetSuperPaymaster/setBLSAggregatorin Registry and SuperPaymaster_decodeRoleDatahelper in MySBT (pure refactor, same behavior)proposalId = keccak256(user, epoch)to work with fixed Registry H-02V5.3 Tests & Docs
test-group-G1(reputation-gated),G2(agent identity ERC-8004),G3(credit tier escalation)ECOSYSTEM-SERVICES-SETUP-GUIDE.md,SDK-E2E-Scenario-Guide.mdSepolia Deployment (already live)
0xD88CF5316c64f753d024fcd665E69789b33A5EB6(unchanged)0x84bB9e3CAfb90C5938731A6dA1ADdee301F0B2D00x3384317Da5312077218C990CeB1010CCb5dc5897(new)0x829C3178DeF488C2dB65207B4225e18824696860(unchanged)0xf4d022Ea721Aaa1Dec8CC8f3B630547D34C6c972On-chain verification:
Registry-4.1.0✅SuperPaymaster-5.3.0✅Test plan
contracts/src/core/Registry.sol— H-02InvalidProposalId(), L-04 zero-addr guardscontracts/src/paymasters/superpaymaster/v3/SuperPaymaster.sol— H-01 CEI reorder, L-04contracts/src/core/GTokenStaking.sol— MAX_TOTAL_STAKE pre-checkcontracts/src/modules/reputation/ReputationSystem.sol— non-zero proposalIddeployments/config.sepolia.json— updated reputationSystem address + updateTime